In Italian communists and the USSR

I came across a very interesting entry in the Italian blog communism, Italy and the USSR. Despite the fact that such a view of communism is the private opinion of an Italian and does not claim to be the ultimate truth, the text is very interesting and touches on very deep things .. Here are some quotes:

"Talking about the relationship between the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Soviet Union might at first glance seem like an aspect of cultural archaeology. However, sometimes it can even be useful to talk about them, not only from a historical point of view, but also in order to analyze in more depth the course of development of Italian politics (including the current one). If we want to understand the essence of modern communism, we must take into account its messianic component. Some time ago, Nello Ajello, in her book The Intelligentsia and the PCI, emphasized that communist activists perceived the socialist camp as a "fighting Church", and as a result, two factions formed.

The political struggle was seen as a confrontation between Good and Evil, and this meant that it was Marxism that was the key to unmistakably distinguishing one from the other and, therefore, joining the "right" side. As soon as his followers became sure that they figured out from which side the truth, which, in turn, was inscribed in a certain historical and political reality (such as, for example, the Soviet Union), they had no doubts about what choice do.

From the point of view of Togliatti (the leader of the Italian communists), communism is not just a stream of certain ideas among many others, it is a whole movement that came out of the very depths of the social order, and was, according to the communist leader, "historically necessary". Its development could stop from time to time, but it never stopped: a classless society was exactly the result to which history would inevitably come anyway, regardless of the desires of individual individuals.

Please note that these reflections of Togliatti, already quite outdated, but still very significant due to their utmost clarity, appeared in the late 50s of the last century. And this is not at all some random theorizing a la Marcuse, but a rigid conceptual scheme, each part of which moves in full accordance with the movements of the clock.

Based on all of the above, we can conclude that in order to understand Marxism and the activities of the parties associated with it, it must be recognized that the communists "believed" in it and in what they are doing, in the religious sense of the word, and "lived" inside myth, the embodiment of which, although not ideal, was the USSR. If you do not take this fact into account, you run the risk of somewhat misunderstanding many events of even the most recent history, Italian and not only. "

The most important thing in this text for me seems to be:
- recognition of the messianic role of communism;
- the communists' vision of the struggle, including the political one, as a confrontation between Good and Evil;
- utopianism, on the one hand, and the rigidity and realism of communist constructions, on the other (the Project is a utopia and an organization);
- Faith and Myth that became a reality (USSR);

Think about it, friends.

RESISTANCE. THE END OF THE DICTATOR

Where is the history of the Popular Front? Where is the unification of anti-fascist forces? Why did the Italian political parties fail to stop Mussolini? Why didn't they team up?

Several reasons are obvious.

Firstly, those who tried to unite different forces against fascism were persecuted and repressed. First of all, the repressions were directed against the Italian communists.

Secondly, it is not easy for all parliamentary parties to unite in principle, because the very essence of representation in parliament requires a struggle for votes, and therefore with each other.

Thirdly, the parties - potential allies in the fight against fascism had disagreements on important fundamental issues, which, as it turned out later, were not the most important. But who knew then?

Communists(the leaders of the Communist Party were A. Bordiga before his arrest in 1923, then P. Togliatti and U. Terracini, from 1924 - A. Gramsci)) called for a decisive revolutionary struggle, denounced the Nazis, and the socialists, and the "poplars". The Communist Party was a member of the Comintern, which in the early 1920s aimed the fraternal Communist Parties at an early world revolution and promoted the tactics of the "united workers' front", the creation of "workers' governments" and the fight against enemies of any kind. Yes, and the situation in Italy, Lenin assessed as pre-revolutionary.

One of the founders of the Communist Party, Amedeo Bordiga, was a supporter of radical actions, who believed that the path of parliamentary struggle was not for the communists. He considered the bourgeoisie to be the main enemy and probably underestimated the potential of the emerging fascist movement. In addition, he did not consider it necessary to create tactical coalitions with the socialists, since any coalitions require concessions from both sides, and the rebuff to fascist terror could only be by force, which was rejected by the socialists (and many communists too).

Antonio Gramsci, who headed the ICP in absentia in 1924, sympathized no less than others with the Russian revolution, but he understood better than others both the essence and the danger of the emerging fascism, which was not only a consequence of poverty, remainingness, demagogy, but also a weapon in the fight against the ideas of socialism and communism. In Italy, there was hardly a truly revolutionary situation, the signs of which V.I. Lenin saw, but the crisis was the most severe. And fascism in Italy, which Gramsci later noted, was supported by the ruling classes as an instrument of counter-revolution, as a means of preventing either revolution or radical reforms in the economy and the social sphere (seizures of enterprises, the creation of workers' councils were just manifestations of the impatience of the "lower classes", to which the "tops" were able to find an answer and begin to manage "in a new way").

Probably, the situation in the leadership of the ICP can be described as internally conflicting - because of the need to follow the instructions of the Comintern and the need to look for an adequate response to the fascist threat in a unique situation. Unique, because in no country in Europe there was anything resembling fascism, just as there was no experience of countering it.

socialists- a party that rejected violence, both revolutionary and fascist, advocated the path of negotiations in solving economic and social problems. In addition, the socialists, despite the split that resulted in the formation of the Communist Party, had a powerful parliamentary faction and could really influence government policy. Did the leaders of the socialists see the threat in the fascist movement? Of course we saw. But, probably, they believed that the state should fight extremism first of all, and their task is to encourage the state to do this. In particular, through parliament, but the deputies of the socialists were not enough for this.

Both parties relied on the working class and partly on the peasantry. But there were more socialists.

Weakened the forces of the left and the very fact of the formation of the Communist Party. In 1919, the Socialist Party welcomed the creation of the Comintern and even practically joined it, but the persistent demands of the leaders of the Comintern to get rid of the reformists led to a split. At the same time, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party suggested to Lenin that each national section of the Comintern be given greater freedom of action - after all, a "purge" of moderates, reformists, centrists would lead to a weakening of the party's position, loss of influence both in trade unions and in local authorities. But Ilyich was adamant.

The consignment "Popolari"(People's Party), like the socialists, advocated the search for compromises, consent and against fascist terror. However, the "Polari" united many zealous Catholics, while the Socialists were a party of "materialists", for the most part anti-clerical. The founder of the Popolari party, the priest Luigi Sturzo, saw the revolution as evil, so they were not on the path with the communists. In addition, the communists were even more anti-clerical than the socialists. Yes, and for the leadership of the Vatican, Mussolini seemed more acceptable than the communists, socialists, and, in the end, the leader of the Popolari.

The point of disagreement was, of course, the seizure of enterprises by workers. The communists welcomed these actions and participated in their organization. Gramsci saw in the workers' self-management of enterprises a new form of power that could solve economic and social problems in the interests of the workers. "Popolari" and the socialists - considered such actions unjustified. At the same time, both the communists and especially the socialists controlled a certain part of the trade unions.

The leaders of the parties that could go to unite against fascism - the socialists and the "poplars" tried to "negotiate in an amicable way" with Mussolini. This agreement was not fulfilled by the Nazis. The policy of "appeasement" of impudent fanatics most often turns out to be useless.

All parties seemed to "not notice" a huge army of people who returned from the war and found themselves poor and unemployed. Namely, it was to these people that Mussolini's rhetoric and demagogy was addressed, it was they who joined his party (although, of course, not only they).

It is worth remembering that in Russia a significant part of the soldiers and sailors supported the Bolsheviks and became their support in the revolution. But the Bolsheviks spent more than one month working in the army. In addition, the composition of the Russian army is predominantly peasants, for whom the revolutionary slogans "land - to the peasants!" and "peace to the nations!" no special explanation was required.

The fascists very quickly came to power (already in 1922) and, having gained power, they took measures not only to weaken and liquidate any opposition, but also to legitimize its political liquidation.

And, of course, the position of the king, the position of the army and police leadership, the position of industrialists, the demagogic propaganda of the Italian fascists and the position of the Catholic Church - all this also affected.

Could the murder of deputy Matteotti be a signal for the unification of forces potentially capable of uniting against fascism? Perhaps it could. But the opposition deputies simply left parliament and waited until the king dismissed Mussolini.

And what if the head of the "Polari" Don Sturzo, who condemned the fascist terror, had not resigned from the post of head of the party? He could simply be excommunicated, or even killed. Sturzo after leaving the post of head of "Popolari" was forced to go abroad.

Was it a mistake to vote in the Parliament of the Socialists and the Popolari for the adoption of a new electoral law in 1924? Undoubtedly. However, not only the law determines the results of voting, but also the course of the election campaign. If it takes place peacefully, "civilized" - the result is one, and if it is accompanied by demagogy and violence - another.

Yes, there were anti-fascists in Italy. Yes, they tried to fight the fascist regime, but...

Soon after Mussolini came to power, neither elections nor parliament practically disappeared. Therefore, it was impossible to achieve success by participating in elections.

The trade unions were virtually liquidated, hence the strike struggle also became either impossible or unsuccessful.

Hold rallies, demonstrations? What are the rallies...

IN AND. Lenin, in a report at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922, said: “Maybe the Nazis in Italy, for example, will render us great services by explaining to the Italians that they are not yet sufficiently enlightened and that their country is not yet guaranteed from the Black Hundreds. Maybe it will be very helpful."

And the chairman of the Comintern, G. Zinoviev, noted: “We must make it clear to ourselves that what happened in Italy is not a local phenomenon. We will inevitably have to face the same phenomena in other countries, although, perhaps, in other forms. we can avoid such a period of more or less fascist upheavals throughout Central and Middle Europe."

Karl Radek (representative of the Polish Communists in the Comintern) said approximately the same thing: "If our comrades in Italy, if the Social Democratic Party of Italy does not understand the reasons for this victory of fascism and the reasons for our defeat, then we will have to face the long domination of fascism."

The terror of one political force against political opponents was really a completely new phenomenon for Italy, and none of the politicians knew what fascism was and what would happen next. What is the armed suppression of strikes or the dispersal of demonstrators represented in all countries. But what is the terror carried out by the parliamentary party, and even supported by the power structures of the state, did not know, perhaps, no one.

Russian revolutionaries knew about the pogroms and about the non-interference of the police and the army in them, as they say, firsthand. All this was in Russia in 1905-1906.

However, the course that the Comintern offered to the communist parties in the early 1920s was to prepare for a world communist revolution, and not at all to establish cooperation with other parties. However, this was the beginning of the 20s, when a world revolution might seem possible, and the Nazis were just beginning their path to power. Moscow in the early 1920s was worried about its own problems - the NEP, the struggle for power under the sick Lenin, the prospects for a revolution in Germany. In general, it was not up to Italy.

In 1922 (a few months before Mussolini's campaign against Rome), the leadership of the Comintern (that is, the RCP (b)) negotiated with the leaders of the Second International. Negotiations on building and possibly establishing relations and interaction in the struggle in the name of the proletariat. Western socialists worried about the fate of the opposition socialists in Russia (Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists), they talked about the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks. And the Bolsheviks responded with reproaches of betraying the interests of the working class of Russia, the proletarian revolution ... They did not agree ...

And in the late 1920s, the leadership of the Comintern oriented the communist parties of other countries to a decisive struggle against the social democrats and socialists, who were called only "social fascists."

And the head of the ICP, Palmiro Togliatti, was forced to support this line and refuse to cooperate with anti-fascists from among the socialists and other parties. Although in the case of arrests, both the communists, and the socialists, and the "populars" ended up in the same cells.

The tactics of "class against class", the struggle against social democracy in practice, in particular in Italy, led to the fact that under the conditions of the underground, the communists blamed the socialists.

In the journal "Communist International" dated October 31, 1930, in the article "The Communist Party of Italy and the leadership of the struggle of the masses", signed simply by the initials M.G. said:

“From the nature of the Italian economic crisis and its interaction with the world crisis, it can be shown that the current development of mass movements offers the prospect of their rapid growth and their rapid transformation into broad political battles.

Fascism, which was supposed to prove (as opposed to Bolshevism!) its ability to solve the problems of the working classes, brought the working people to starvation and doomed them to slavery.

The collapse of fascism gives rise to a reshuffling of political forces in the country."

Further, the author wrote that the ruling fascist party was disintegrating, dissatisfaction with the regime was growing within the fascist trade unions, leaflets and appeals were being distributed among Catholic organizations, Masons and social democratic organizations.

"The so-called Anti-Fascist Concentration has recently come up with a "Pact of Unity and Action", which is the program of its constituent parties. This program is valid "until the overthrow of fascism and until the stabilization of the invincible Italian state by republican democracy."

It is clear that the Concentration wants to use the movement of the toiling masses for its own purposes; Concentration wants to prevent the struggle of the masses of workers and peasants from leading to the overthrow of capitalism, to a socialist revolution, to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Italy, which is defined in the Pact as an "illusion," as "despotism of the party," "an attack on the normal laws of economic evolution."

It is clear that the Concentration wants to prevent the orientation of the Italian proletariat towards the Communist Party, wants to prevent the implementation of a bloc of workers, peasants, national minorities and the native population of the African colonies, because such a bloc means a victorious struggle of the working masses against fascism, means the overthrow and destruction of the capitalist state.

For the servants of the bourgeoisie who run the so-called Anti-Fascist Concentration, capitalism currently still has the "normal" function of progressive development. They deny that the Italian crisis is one of the manifestations of the deadly crisis of the capitalist system. They want to be believed that they have the means to resolve the crisis. But their "Pact" will not be able to deceive the masses. Exuberant chatter about freedom and democracy cannot gloss over what is essential in the "Pact"; what is essential in it is the idea that the transition from fascism to an "invincible" democratic state is nothing but a new form of the fascist regime.

Social-Democracy can therefore think politically only in a fascist way. It does not put forward any of the demands of the masses directed against the bourgeoisie; all the demands of the Concentration are directed against the workers and peasants.

She promises the workers to clear the way "for every just demand of them." The plagiarism here is quite obvious. These gentlemen graciously promise the workers to give them the right to fight for "every just demand." They, like the fascists, become "above classes," i.e., actually take the side of entrepreneurs. They are preparing to stifle the struggle of the working people who defend their demands, which are always just, because they are the cement of the struggle of the exploited against the exploiters.

Our Social-Democrats have gone over to the camp of the enemy, like their comrades in all countries, and therefore they are afraid even to make democratic promises that would still remain unfulfilled.

The "Pact of Unity and Action" put before the Italian Communist Party the need for a resolute and merciless struggle against social fascism - a competitor of fascism, in the matter of preserving and defending the capitalist system.

... The KPI opposes the "Pact" of Concentration to the aims of the struggle of the Italian proletariat.

The solution to the crisis of Italian fascism lies in the seizure of power by the proletariat and in the organization of power on the basis of councils of workers', peasants', soldiers' and sailors' deputies; in the expropriation and socialization of factories and banks; in the expropriation of large landowners; in recognizing the right of “national minorities and colonial peoples to independence up to the distance from Italy; in arming the proletariat in order to ensure the defense of the workers' state and to suppress the slightest attempt at opposition on the part of its enemies; in the abolition of freedom of the press, organizations and all political rights for the bourgeoisie.

Our program is not only not utopian, but it is relevant."

It is difficult, of course, to assess the true intentions of the aforementioned anti-fascist "Concentration". Approximately in the same terms the author characterized another group "Justice and Freedom".

And, of course, it is absolutely difficult to imagine what the opponents of the fascist regime could do inside the country (and outside the country too) to overthrow or soften it. But still, probably, the most important thing was not to sort things out among themselves, but to prepare for the moment when it would be possible to act and determine how the future of Italy after Mussolini would be determined.

There is no doubt that parliamentary democracy provides more opportunities for defending the rights and expressing one's position than dictatorship for the working people, the intelligentsia, and even the bourgeoisie (in terms of that time). Nevertheless, the author argued that "The Soviet and socialist solution to the crisis is the only one capable of answering the questions posed by Italian reality, is the only national and democratic solution to the crisis. Any other way out opposed to this is a hoax dictated by the interests of protecting the capitalist "order" and society."

The article admitted that the successes of the Italian communists were not great:

"... we must call on the fact that the activity of our party, as one of the elements that determine the political crisis, is far behind.

So far, however, we have succeeded only to a very small extent in mobilizing and organizing the broad masses on the basis of their most pressing demands. In order to restructure the entire work of the party in this direction, the Politburo of the KPI has undertaken a campaign centered on the most important immediate economic and political demands of the masses, namely:

a) A 20% increase in all wages.

b) An allowance for all unemployed in industry and agriculture in the amount of at least 10 liras per day for the entire period of unemployment.

c) Elections of intrafactory commissions.

d) Freedom of trade unions, press and strikes for the proletariat.

e) Refusal of sharecroppers, colones, small tenants and small owners from paying taxes.

f) Release of all political prisoners; abolition of the Special Tribunal in emergency laws.

The campaign for these demands, linked to our extended revolutionary slogans, must be carried out in the form of conferences in factories, agricultural enterprises. enterprises and villages, meetings of the unemployed, on the basis of the widest possible organization of a united front from below, at these conferences and meetings committees of struggle must be elected to mobilize the masses and to lead the struggle. At the same time, the Party issued directives on the organization of workers' defense groups.

How realistic were the ideas of the Comintern about the seizure of power by the proletariat and the creation of soviets in Italy in 1930? It was unrealistic and utopian ..

The course of the Comintern for cooperation with other left parties, and not for confrontation with them, for the creation of popular fronts to fight fascism was announced only in the mid-30s, when not only Mussolini, but also Hitler, and their supporters, came to power (albeit less numerous, but just as aggressive) existed in many European countries.

On August 17, 1934, the Italian Communist Party and the Socialist Party sign in Paris (in Paris - !!!) the first pact on unity of action.

How to stop the fascists rushing to power? Strikes? Rallies? Requirements for the authorities to take decisive action? Armed resistance? Speeches in parliament or the press?

Can politicians unite in general to achieve some common goals, and not only when voting on a particular bill?

In 1921, "Arditi del Popolo" ("People's daredevils") began to be created - fighting squads from among anarchists, socialists, communists, trade union activists to organize an armed rebuff to the terror of Mussolini's Blackshirts. Among the organizers and leaders of these squads were Apro Secondari, Mingrino, Gino Luchetti (he tried to kill Mussolini on September 11, 1926) and others.

Although the squads included members of different parties, the leadership of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party did not officially support them, and critical articles even appeared in the relevant party publications. It is known that in 1921 Lenin criticized the then Communist leader A. Bordiga for sectarianism and unwillingness to support the revolutionary initiative (the leadership of the Communist Party demanded that the Communists not participate in squads, since they include members of other "unfriendly" parties).

After the Socialist Party signed a "pacification agreement" with Mussolini, it refused to recognize the people's squads. The leadership of the General Confederation of Labor took the same position.

The communists tried to organize their own self-defense combat units (Squadre comuniste d "azione), but their numbers were small, and in general the party adhered to a non-violent strategy.

The most consistent in supporting the People's Guards were the anarchists, who tried to engage in individual terror against fascist activists and leaders.

One of the most important successes of the Druzhina was achieved in Parma in August 1922, when 350 vigilantes, led by World War I veterans Antonio Sieri and Guido Pisegli, successfully defended the city against the advance of 20,000 fascists.

Parma 1922. Barricades against the Nazis on the streets of the city.

The total number of "vigilantes" throughout the country amounted to 20,000 people, but within a few years the leaders were either arrested or killed, and the movement was effectively liquidated by 1924.

The intelligentsia protested. Thus, Benedetto Croce wrote the Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intelligentsia, which was published in 1925. Anti-fascist resistance groups arose and in some territories that were annexed to Italy as a result of the First World War, the Slovenes and Croats created the TIGR organization, which organized acts of sabotage and attacks on members of the fascist party and the military.

Joint (but organizationally weak) performances of anti-fascists began not in Italy, but outside of it.

Emigrants from Italy (and most of them were in France) - socialists, republicans create small anti-fascist cells in Marseille, Toulouse, Paris.

In 1929, the socialist Carlo Roselli, who escaped from an Italian prison in the Aeolian Islands, creates the anti-fascist movement "Justice and Freedom" with the participation of socialists, radicals, and even "populars". This "popular front", modest in its capabilities, prepared a program that involved the establishment of a republican system in Italy and, of course, the fight against Mussolini's regime, tried to organize underground resistance groups in northern Italy, and smuggle anti-fascist literature into the country.
However, the underground cells were crushed, and Roselli himself was killed in 1937.

Small anti-fascist underground cells in Italy itself could do little - except to issue semi-handwritten leaflet newspapers.

Underground edition

During the Spanish Civil War, about 70,000 soldiers and officers were sent to help General Franco Mussolini. Volunteers from around the world fought on the side of the anti-fascists in Spain, including 4,000 Italians - including activists and leaders of different parties - Carlo Roselli himself, and the general secretary of the Republican Party Angeloni, and the communist Luigi Longo (later head of the ICP) , and the socialist Pietro Nenni. The battles in Spain showed that ideological differences were of little importance in the struggle against a common enemy. The Garibaldi brigade managed to inflict several defeats on their compatriots sent by Mussolini. And when notes about this appeared in several Italian newspapers, Mussolini was furious.

Italian volunteers in Spain

In September 1938, the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party addressed an open letter to the Italian Catholics with a proposal for cooperation in the fight against fascism, and later issued a statement about the need to create a Popular Front.

Representatives of different parties also united in partisan detachments, which in 1943, after the departure of Mussolini, began an active armed struggle with both Italian and German fascists, and organizing strikes in the occupied territory.

Partisan resistance was a mass phenomenon, especially in the northern regions of the country. Approximately 44,700 partisans died in battles with the Nazis, more than 21,000 people were injured. Several tens of thousands of people died in concentration camps, about 15,000 civilians were killed during actions of retaliation and intimidation, which were committed by the Nazis - both Italian and German.

Italians who emigrated from the country also fought in partisan detachments. More than 250,000 people participated in the fighting in Italy and abroad. Over 70,000 died and over 30,000 were injured.

The Italians also helped prisoners of war who managed to escape from concentration camps. And in the ranks of the partisans operating in Italy, there were German, French, and Russian anti-fascists.

seven brothers Chervi, killed on 12/28/1943 -

Allied troops landed in southern Italy in 1943, but some towns in the north of the country were liberated before they arrived. In June 1944, the first "free government" was formed by the National Liberation Committee.

toppled monument to dictator

In conclusion, it is worth adding that in April 1945, Mussolini was captured by Italian partisans while trying to move to Switzerland and, along with his mistress Clara Petacci, was shot. Their bodies were taken to Milan and hung upside down in Piazza Loretto.

This was the end of Mussolini.

In the first post-war elections in 1946, the Socialists received 21% of the vote, the Communists - 19%, the Christian Democratic Party - 35% of the vote.

In the Senate elections in 1948, the joint list of communists and socialists received 31% of the vote.

The Communist Party of Italy, long the flagship of the communists in the country, and one of the most successful communist parties in the world, emerged in the early 1920s. Actually, it was founded in 1921, in a rather standard way - as a result of the departure of the Leninists from the socialist party. Banned since 1926, the first congress was held abroad, in Lyon, and operated underground for 18 years. It was the only political party that really and thoroughly participated in the resistance movement.

At the end of the era of fascism in Italy, she participated in the cabinets of 1944-47, in May 1947 she was removed from work in the government, and since then she has not been in cabinets for more than 30 years - and at the same time, only in 2008, for the first time after the war, did not there turned out to be no one who called himself a communist. Its confrontation with the Christian Democrats largely determined the entire political life of the country in 1945-90, and the confrontation took on a variety of forms, political overtones had a struggle for the championship of two prominent masters of cycling, Coppi and Bartali, a communist and a Christian democrat, respectively, in 1940 -50s. By the mid-70s, the PKI was considered the largest and most influential of the communist parties of democratic countries, collecting from 20% to a third of the votes, chronically controlled Bologna, Turin, Rome, Florence, it was in Italy that the concept of the "red belt" was formed, which in this case included the provinces Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria. The communists were famous for organizing socially useful activities, from cleaning the streets and improving services to organizing festivals and fairs, individual work with voters on the principle of "every door", and in general organization as such. In 1976, the zenith of electoral popularity was reached - 34% of the vote. It is believed that it was the activity of the Communist Party that made it possible to break through the idea of ​​\u200b\u200bbuilding an automobile plant in the USSR by the Fiat concern, now known as the Volga Automobile Plant, in the city of Stavropol, Kuibyshev Region, now known as Tolyatti after the leader of the Communist Party of the 30-40s.

Since the mid-70s, as part of the strategy of "national solidarity" and "historic compromise", the Christian Democrats under the leadership of Aldo Moro began to move closer to the PKI - it is believed that the Christian Democrats tended to cooperate with the Communist Party in the hope of repeating the same trick with it as before with the socialists - to involve in the affairs of the government and through this strangle. Moro's death at the hands of the "Red Brigades" led to a departure from this strategy.

In general, the party professed Eurocommunism and tended to cooperate with political opponents, finally departed from the Soviet camp in 1979, and did without Soviet money, receiving state subsidies according to the number of its adherents, which were many. The PKI spoke out very sharply on the issues of the Soviet-Chinese split, the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and the activity of the Red Brigades.

In the 80s, the party was in some disorientation, and in 1991 it split into two, large and small, respectively, the Democratic Left (PDS, then DS) and the “reconstituted” one (PRK or RK). The PDS proclaimed a course under the slogan "we have renewed ourselves to build a new Italy", was admitted to the Socialist International (in some way returned to its former ranks), sometimes delegates ministers, its member D'Alema led the cabinet for two years (1998-2000), and another a prominent functionary, Napolitano, became president of Italy in 2006; Veltroni, who claimed the premiership from the “left” in the 2008 elections, was also a communist, and for seven years the mayor of Rome. In 1998, the new leader of the party, d'Alema, managed to bring to agreement a whole bloc of left-wing parties that made up a single grouping of "left democrats" (PD).

The Republic of Kazakhstan collects 4-8% in elections, with a median of about 6%. The ROK and Lega Nord are the only parties that object to a foreign policy consensus expressed in a strictly pro-American pattern of behavior. The RK was responsible for the fall of the cabinet in 1998 because it did not agree with its budgetary policy.

Dmitry ZHVANIA, candidate of historical sciences

1920 Italian workers occupied the factory

The destruction of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) - the most powerful Communist Party in Western Europe - was the biggest tragedy of the international left movement. At the time of the collapse of the ICP, many perceived it as a natural consequence of the collapse of the USSR and world communism. However, it is not. Without any doubt, the collapse of the USSR caused demoralization, confusion and vacillation in the leftist camp. However, the world communist movement exploded on a time bomb planted by its Compromiser leaders long before 1991. And this is very clearly seen in the history of the Italian Communist Party. And this example shows how compromise with the bourgeois system ultimately turns out for the left party.

Professor of Italian literature Enrico Fenzi, an intellectual who joined the Red Brigades, believes that the armed struggle launched by the Italian ultra-left was a reaction to “the duality of the Communist Party, which emerged in the 70s under the influence of major changes. In the 1970s, the ICP could no longer hide its dual nature... it had to represent the interests of the state, protect institutions, take the side of the Carabinieri, open the way for extremism... Armed struggle for the "Red Brigades" was not a political formula, but a policy. The only way to get out of the confines of the policy of the ICP and the official left, the only way to get out of the partyocratic paralysis” (1). Enrico Fenzi personally participated in the attack on Carlo Castellano, a member of the Central Committee of the ICP.

The policy of the Italian Communist Party in the 70s was not accidental. It was the result of all the previous activities of the Italian communists. To become a party of bourgeois law and order—that was the task to which the policy of the ICP was subordinated. In the words of Herbert Marcuse, the ICP has more than once played the role of "doctor at the bedside of capitalism" (2). Let us consider the most characteristic moments that help to understand the essence of the ICP and the reasons why this party caused a reaction of rejection among the left-wing radical youth.

"Salerno turn"

ICP founder Antonio Gramsci. Its slogan is: "I hate the indifferent!"

As early as 1927, the young communist leaders, Luigi Longo and Pietro Secchia, activists of the underground communist youth organization, expressed disagreement with the methods of fighting against fascism that the leadership of the PCI prescribed for them. In January 1928, an open clash broke out in Basel at the Second Party Conference. “We know perfectly well,” said the then chairman of the PCI Ruggero Grieco (headed the PCI from 1934 to 1938), in his opening speech, “what exactly some comrades who want more mean. We are talking about individual terror, about terrorist acts. Well, for example, to cheer up the masses, to go ahead and blow up some kind of power grid, and at the same time X and Y will die ”(3).

After Amadeo Bordiga was expelled from the party, Antonio Gramsci and others were arrested, Palmiro Togliatti seized the leadership in the party. “The leader of the party, Palmiro Togliatti, lives in the Lux Hotel in Moscow, visits Paris ... he does not have the opportunity to illegally visit Italy: the risk is too great,” Cecilia Keen writes in the book “Italian Rebus” (4). While the leader of the party made himself comfortable in Moscow's Lux Hotel, the rank-and-file activists fought the fascist regime in deep underground.

Togliatti left Moscow only in the spring of 1944, in order to finally, "without risking his life", return to his country. He arrives in southern Italy, in Naples. “The Neapolitan comrades want to decide everything tomorrow, but Togliatti postpones the meeting for several days: he needs to look around, although all the main points of the strategy were outlined back in Moscow” (5). Tolyatti, obeying the Kremlin's instructions, does not even start talking about the establishment of a socialist regime in the country. “Tolyatti was so careful that he did not speak out at all about the problem of “republic or monarchy”,” says Keen (6). From his point of view, it is necessary “to end the war, drive the Nazis out of Italy, and then we will see. It is necessary, one way or another, to come to an agreement with other parties that took part in the Resistance, and with the Anglo-American allies ”(7).

Party activists operating in the north of Italy, and not only in the north, thought quite differently. But Tolyatti crushed this dissatisfaction with the authority of the Kremlin courtier.

On April 21, 1944, a coalition government of "national unity" was created in Salerno, in other words, the second government of Marshal Pietro Badoglio. It included Tolyatti and two more communists, representatives of other parties that participated in the Resistance, as well as the famous philosopher Benedetto Croce. “But doesn't the Salerno turn fit into Stalin's vast international strategy? - says Cecilia Keene. “Tolyatti said more than once or twice that the “Salerno turn” was simply a development of the line outlined back in 1940” (8). However, not all communists approved of this step. After all, none other than Badoglio suppressed the communist uprising in July-August 1943, which was a reaction to the removal of Benito Mussolini on July 25, 1943.

Badoglio's cabinet lasted only a month and a half. On June 4, 1944, American troops entered Rome. Soon the first cabinet of the socialist, member of the Resistance, Ivanoe Bonomi, was formed. It included Tolyatti and representatives of other parties that participated in the Resistance. “Some, especially the people of the Action Party, made utopian plans: they wanted to create a government from the left alone. But Togliatti was never a utopian and strongly protested, saying that all this was abstraction” (9).

Amadeo Bordiga is one of the organizers of the IKP, from which he was expelled for left-wing sectarianism.

On December 10, 1944, the second Bonomi cabinet was formed, which again included all the parties of the Resistance. One of the main biographers of Tolyatti - Giorgio Bocca - noted that the "Salerno turn" was not an accidental gesture, but the beginning of a long-term policy. As the socialist Pietro Nenni told Bocca, “Togliatti thought little about the fact that the hour of the tenth future revolution might come. He systematically pursued his line: it is necessary to participate in the government. In addition, we quickly realized that he did not at all consider the problem of merging with the socialists and creating a new united party to be very important. The real problem was the relationship with the Catholics, much more important than the question of the republic” (10).

But many activists of the ICP, who fought fascism with arms in their hands, did not share the conciliatory course of Tolyatti. On April 25, 1945, a victorious uprising took place. Communist partisans shot Mussolini, but the civil war continued. In Milan, groups of partisans sought out the most prominent fascists, known for their cruelty, in order to deal with them without waiting for any orders and courts. Not only ordinary partisans, but also some leaders were sure that it was impossible to stop, that the struggle continued.

"Wind from the North" - this is the name given to the partisan opposition in the Italian Communist Party. It was headed by Luigi Longo and Pietro Secchia, the recognized leaders of the partisan movement. Secchier resolutely did not like the political course of Tolyatti. He opposed the amnesty for ordinary fascists, which Togliatti, being the Minister of Justice, carried out in the interests of "national unity". It was under this amnesty that the "black prince" Valerio Borghesi was released, who became one of the organizers of December 12, 1969 and other terrorist adventures of the extreme right.

Secchia patronized an organization called the "Red Flying Squad" ("Volante Rossa"). Its activists went in for sports and cracked down on former fascists. When the "Red Flying Squad" sent some fascist to the other world, Secchi's close associate - Giulio Seniga, nicknamed Nino - a worker, partisan, during the Resistance proved to be an exceptionally brave man - he joked: “Well, another one was saved from harmful smoking habits” (11).

The strategy and tactics of the "new party", which was created by Togliatti, dictated caution and gradualism. “Tolyatti patiently and persistently explains to all the partisan leaders of the northern cities the meaning of the “Salerno turn”, explains what a new type of party is, a new party that he creates,” writes Keen (12).

Pietro Secchia was against the conciliatory course of Palmiro Togliatti. Patronized the "Red Flying Squad", which cracked down on the Nazis

In fact, talk of a "new type of party" served as a verbal cover for the old bureaucratic manipulations. Secchia and Longo were transferred to party work in Rome. Longo was appointed deputy of Togliatti, and Secchiu was appointed head of the organizational department. The opposition "Wind from the North" was a manifestation of the anxiety of the Italian proletariat over the results of the civil war. However, being closely associated with the leadership of the apparatus of the PCI, it was liquidated by simple bureaucratic tactics. The sober realism of His Excellency Palmiro Togliatti won (13).

Further, the PCI more and more fit into the traditional bourgeois legal order: Togliatti is a member of the first three coalition governments led by the Christian Democrat Alcide De Gasperi, a prominent member of the PCI, Umberto Terracini, is elected deputy chairman of the Constituent Assembly, participates in the development of the Constitution of the republic, the party participates in municipal elections.

But on July 14, 1948, an event occurred that almost upset the plans of the leadership of the ICP. At 11:30, almost next to the Palazzo Montecitorio, the fascist Antonio Pallante made an attempt on Togliatti. The bullet hit the back of the head. Many regarded the incident as a government conspiracy against Togliatti. The ICP newspaper "Unita" ("Unity" - "Unity") issued an emergency issue with the headline "Down with the murderous government!" Bocca writes: “Having learned that Togliatti had been shot at, workers' and communist Italy acts without waiting for the directives of the party. There is a general strike, unprecedented in scope in Italian history. The authority of the state in the largest Italian cities seems to have evaporated, a period of interregnum begins, when anything can happen ”(14). However, Togliatti, recovering himself, whispered to his comrades: “Calm, I beg you, calm. Let's not do stupid things" (15).

Already on the morning of July 15, the socialist Nenni understood and recorded in his diary: the leaders of the Communist Party do not want to raise the people to revolt, because they see no real chances for success. “…neither the government nor the Communist Party wants the situation to worsen. Two more days pass. The government is "in control". And Longo (who until recently was a supporter of the continuation of the armed struggle - J.J.), speaking in parliament in the presence of the press, sarcastically declares that ordinary Italians are being intimidated (“Threat of rebellion!”, “Hannibal at our gates!”), Instead to seriously and calmly think about solving national problems” (16).

On July 17, the Central Committee of the IKP at a meeting approved the termination of the general strike. The year 1948 ended quietly, "without stupidity", without new upheavals.

Doctor at the bedside of capitalism

The leader of the ICP Palmiro Togliatti was afraid of "nonsense"

The Italian communists experienced Stalin's death as a great grief. The "revelations" of Nikita Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU made a huge impression on them. According to Enrico Berlinguer, he experienced a real shock. "Tolyatti did not want to 'injure the party' and tried to dose information about the revelations" (17). But the leader of the Italian Communist Youth Federation, Enrico Berlinguer, who until recently carried a small portrait of Stalin with him, “insisted on telling the communists the whole truth” (18). On December 20, 1956, he spoke at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the IKP, “his speech caused a great resonance, and they began to write about him as a “rising star”” (19).

The 20th Congress of the CPSU gave a theoretical justification for the pro-bourgeois policy of the Communist Party. “The working class and its vanguard, the Marxist-Leninist Communist Parties, are striving to carry out the socialist revolution in a peaceful way,” the Program of the CPSU wrote. “This would be in the interests of the working class and the entire people, the national interests of the country” (20). The communist parties were tasked with "winning a strong majority in parliament, turning it from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people" (21). After the death of Togliatti, the party was headed by Luigi Longo, "with whom Enrico was all the time" (22). After Longo suffered a stroke, the party was effectively led by Berlinguer.

The years 1968-69 are marked in history by major social and political battles. According to Berlinguer himself, in Italy “the number of strike hours exceeded 68 million in 1968, the highest figure in recent years. But already in the first two months of 1969 more than 44 million strike hours were registered” (23).

And what? “The Communist Party has returned to its proper path of cautious, controlled reformism,” writes British left-wing Marxist Chris Harman. The communists have sold out! And when the government resigned over the summer in protest against a general strike called by the unions, the unions called for an end to the strike. The communist leader Berlinguer issued a statement in which he argued that the main problem that exists in factories is increasing labor productivity ”(24).

The ICP did everything possible to channel the working pressure. “The struggle is for the expansion of the rights of workers in the conclusion of collective agreements,” Berlinguer explained, “for new trade union and political rights, for achieving a significant reduction in working hours, for various forms of control over the rhythms of work, for improving sanitary conditions, for the right to hold meetings in enterprises and in the shops” (25).

Analyzing the actions of the ICP, even if only for the period of the late 60s, it can be called not only a doctor, but a resuscitator of capitalism.

In the late 60s, many left-wing intellectuals began to leave the Communist Party, dissatisfied with its reformism. The Communist Party itself got rid of some left-wing intellectuals. For example, Rossana Rossandra and Lucio Magri were expelled from the PCI in 1969 because in September 1968 they protested against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. They started publishing the magazine "Il Manifesto". Unlike the other group “to the left of the IKP”, “Lotta continua!” (“The Fight Continues!”), which targeted students, the group “Il Manifesto” tried to propagandize Communist Party activists. But just like “Lotta continua!”, “Il Manifesto” proclaimed Maoism as its theoretical basis. She had far fewer activists than the LC, but her ideas were a big hit. The group published a daily newspaper that published discussions between various currents and organizations. Since 1971, she has been collaborating with LC. Since 1973, she advocated the creation of a Popular Unity-type government in Chile. In 1974, the Manifesto group merged with the Left Socialist group.

Historical compromise and Eurocommunism

A fighter of the International Brigades in Spain and one of the leaders of the anti-fascist Resistance in Italy, Luigi Longo, continued the conciliatory course of Palmiro Togliatti, who initially condemned

In 1971, one of the main issues in the political life of Italy was the choice of the President of the Republic. Francesco de Martino, one of the leaders of the Italian Socialist Party, was considered the official candidate of the left. But since 1969, confidential negotiations have been held between a member of the leadership of the PCI, Luciano Barca, and one of Aldo Moro's closest employees, Tullio Ancoro. “On Christmas Eve, December 24, 1971, Barco and Enrico Berlinguer came to Ankora’s house,” writes Cecilia Keane in the article “Three Tragedies,” Barco later described this meeting. Both Moro and Berlinguer seemed a little stiff, finally Berlinguer spoke first, saying that the Italian communists were ready to support Moro's candidacy for the presidency of the Republic. Moreau thanked him with restraint, but remarked that his party apparently had other plans” (26).

As can be seen from the above example, the PCI made every effort to become a respectable bourgeois party. And for this, its leaders were ready to support not a left-wing candidate for the presidency, but a prominent Christian Democrat. But they were still weighed down by both the weight of the Stalinist past and the reputation of Kremlin puppets. To achieve this goal, the leadership of the ICP needed, firstly, to weaken ties with Moscow, and, secondly, to change the social base of the party.

Berlinguer published three articles in the party magazine Rinascita (Renaissance) under the general title Reflections on Italy after the Events in Chile. “We are not talking about a leftist alternative, but a democratic alternative. In other words, about possible cooperation and agreement between the masses of the people following the communists and socialists, with the masses following the Catholics, as well as about cooperation with other democratic formations,” such is the central thought of Berlinguer (27). In the last of the three articles, Berlinguer used the term historical compromise. Not everyone liked this term. Many young, radical activists left the party. Berlinguer envisioned the historic compromise as one of the milestones on the path that would lead the PCI to permanent participation in government.

On March 18, 1975, the XIV Congress of the PCI, called the Congress of "historical compromise", opened in Rome. “There was another force that could offer its services to save Italian capitalism,” writes Chris Harman, “this is the ICP. For a long time she was a critical supporter of the reform strategy, and the political unrest of the early 70s gave her the opportunity to serve the existing order even better and reduce her criticism even more. Party leader Berlinguer used the military coup in Chile to call for power sharing with the CDA. Chile's experience, said Berlinguer, showed that a country polarized between right and left was in danger of being overthrown. The way out is a historic compromise between the parties that will contribute to stability” (28). The PCI did everything possible to appease the ruling Christian Democratic Party, to erase the contradictions between the electoral base of the PCI and the CDA.

“In our country, the Catholic question and the communist question are not just superficially intertwined. They are intertwined in the entire social fabric so much that it is impossible to talk about one without talking about the other, we read in the book “Catholics of the 70s”. - In fact, the cultural and historical tradition of the PCI grew up in Italy not against, but alongside, fought together with the Catholic tradition. And there is continuity in the search for meeting points and convergence between the two traditions, for all their significant differences. Convergence in the name of building a socialist society based on all the historical components of the country” (29).

In the municipal elections on June 15, 1975, the communists won. They were ahead in the parliamentary elections on June 20, 1976. “The votes were given to the ICP,” stated the official bourgeois newspaper Corriere della Sera (“Evening Correspondence”), “because this party was able to prove its seriousness, its ability to come up with concrete proposals” (30). “The victory of the ICP was a triumph for the party and personally for Berlinguer,” says Cecilia Keene (31). But the CDA has completely retained its electorate.

Enrico Berlinguer talked "not about the left alternative, but about the democratic alternative"

The ICP felt an urgent need to separate itself from the politics of the Moscow bureaucracy. “It was necessary to mark the line separating the ideological values ​​and cultural positions of the major Western European communist parties from the experience of the parties that were in power in the countries of Eastern Europe,” wrote Massimo D’Alema, editor-in-chief of the Unita newspaper. “It was, first of all, the theme of political democracy, its universal significance in social progress” (32).

At the Madrid meeting on March 2-3, 1977, Berlinguer (leader of the Italian Communist Party), Santiago Corrillo (leader of the Spanish Communist Party) and Georges Marchais (leader of the French Communist Party) made a joint statement called the "Eurocommunist Manifesto". It pointed out that the old bourgeois democracy of the times of Marx and Lenin no longer existed. The rights and freedoms of the working people were expanded, the power of the bourgeoisie was limited. In place of the bourgeois one comes "advanced democracy", which sharply increases the rights and freedoms of the working people. “Among the transformative factors, the role of democracy is irreversibly increasing. It is the formula of social progress, its driving force” (33).

The institutions of this democracy can be used to renew society, moreover, they can be preserved in the new society. “We consider the parliament the most important institution of the political life of Italy,” Berlinguer argued, “not only today, but also during the period of transition to socialism and in the course of its construction” (34).

Aldo Moro was one year away from being kidnapped by the Red Brigades, and Berlinguer gave political guarantees to the bourgeois parties: “We believe that in Italy it is possible and must not only move towards socialism, but also build a socialist society with the participation of various political forces, organizations and parties, and that the working class can and must carry out its historical mission in a democratic and pluralistic system” (35).

Eurocommunism placed Berlinguer and the PCI in positions historically occupied by right-wing social democracy. This, in general, was not hidden. “The word ‘Laborism’,” wrote Unita’s next editor-in-chief Claudio Petruccioli, who in 2005 will head Italian state television in 2005, wrote in Unita in the summer of 1980, “one can understand a lot, including some good, acceptable things ... We wanted I would like to remind you that when we talk about the “third way”, we are also convinced that the Italian left can and should use everything positive that is in the experience of the Laborites and the Social Democrats” (36).

More and more, the ICP claimed to be the representative of the "general national interests". “We communists,” said Berlinguer, “must take into account this deep coincidence of the interests of the working class and the general interest of the country, and build on this basis a political, economic, social line that will make it possible to carry out a progressive change in the mechanisms and structures of the system of production and consumption in accordance with the needs working class and country" (37).

“Eurocommunism of the 1970s was an important step towards the integration of a number of European communist parties into the political institutions of their countries. The social interests of a part of their bureaucracy ceased to depend on the “socialist camp” and began to be more and more associated with receiving income from holding positions in their own state,” Claude Gabriel notes in the pages of the Trotskyist magazine Intervzglyad (38).

The political course of the ICP could not but affect its social base.

Slow death

Of course, the expansion of the social base of the IKP was reflected in its membership. Even among the secretaries of sections (grassroots organizations) practicing Catholics appeared: according to a survey conducted in 1980, of the secretaries who joined the party in 1976-78, there were 5% of them. At the same time, from 1968 to 1981, the share of workers in the party decreased from 50.4% to 45.4% as a result of a faster growth in the share of other social strata in which the ICP had not previously had serious influence. The representation of the urban petty bourgeoisie grew from 1968 to 1981 from 6.6% to 9.1%, and that of the civil servants and intelligentsia from 3.3% to 10% (39).

The workers remained the core of the party, still formed the basis of the grassroots structure. “Among the members of the governing committees of the sections, there were 46.3% of them” (40). A different picture emerged at higher levels of leadership. The PCI, having finally become part of the bourgeois legal order, having risen to the level of government policy, has acquired a whole army of bureaucracy: city mayors, municipal councilors, parliamentarians, trade union bosses, qualified personnel who develop the social and economic programs of the party, and journalists. The bureaucracy of the PCI, in its social position and in its social interests, was much closer to the traditional bourgeoisie than to the working class. In the words of Lenin, in the ICP “a whole social stratum of parliamentarians, journalists, officials of the labor movement, privileged employees and some strata of the proletariat has matured, which has grown together with the national bourgeoisie and which this bourgeoisie has fully managed to appreciate and “adapt”” (41). Eurocommunism, extolling the importance of "political democracy", its universal significance (42), was in the best possible way in the interests of the party bureaucracy, which was interested in maintaining the bourgeois status quo. There was also an increased attention to winning support in the new, non-proletarian strata, which is characteristic of the policy of "historical compromise". “Between the XIII and XIV Congresses of the PCI (1972-1975), the percentage of workers in the committees of the federations (organizations on a provincial scale) decreased from 33 to 25. In 1978, 23.4% of the members of the committees of the federations were workers, 23.8% were employees and Engineers (in 1975 the latter was only 18%). This change was especially noticeable over a long period. For a quarter of a century (1951-1975), the percentage of middle managers who came from workers decreased from 44.2% to 26.6%. In 1977, at a conference of one of the federations operating in the industrial province of Central Italy, only 19% of the workers were among the delegates, while 63% of teachers, students and employees "(43). It must be borne in mind that the middle-level workers of the Communist Party were mainly representatives of the labor aristocracy.

In a word, in the middle of the 1970s the ICP finally degenerated into a bourgeois party, which by its actions severely disoriented the working class; a party that is far "from the old notions of revolutionism"; the party of "strong reformism" (44).

It all ended very sadly. Italy, a country with strong anti-capitalist and leftist traditions, was left without a powerful leftist party. In 1991, the ICP abandoned its old name, transforming into the Party of Democratic Left Forces. During the activity of this party, the number of its members fell from 989,708 to 613,412. Now the government of Italy is headed by the representative of the Democratic Party Enrico Letta. But this does not mean that a bright streak has come for the working people of this country.

List of used literature:

1. Bocca G. Noi terroristi: 12 anni di lotta armata ricostruiti e discussi con i protagonisti. - Milano: Garzanti, 1985. - P.18.
2. Waddis Jack. "New" theories of revolution. — M.: Progress, 1975. — P.357.
3. Mafai M. L'Uomo che sognava la lotta armata. La storia di Pietro Secchia. - Milano: 1984. - P.21-22.
4. Kin Ts.I. Italian puzzle. - M .: Politizdat, 1991. - P. 258.
5. Ibid. - P.212.
6. Ibid. - P.218.
7. Ibid. - P.212.
8. Ibid. - P.257.
9. Ibid. - P.213.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid. - P.262.
12. Ibid. - P.260-261.
13. Ibid. - P.261.
14. Ibid. - P.235.
15. Ibid. - P.234.
16. Ibid. — P.235-236.
17. Kin Ts.I. Three tragedies // Problems of philosophy - M., 1990. - N 4.- P.107.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Program of the CPSU (adopted by the XXII Congress of the CPSU). - M.: Politizdat, 1962. - P.39.
21. Ibid. - P.40.
22. Kin Ts.I. Three tragedies. - P.107.
23. International meeting of communist and workers' parties. Moscow, 1969. - Prague: Peace and Socialism, 1969. - P. 480.
24 Harman Ch. The fire last time: 1968 and after. — London, Chicago, Melbourne: Bookmarks, 1988. — P.198.
25. International meeting of communist and workers' parties. - P.480.
26. Kin Ts.I. Three tragedies. - P.108.
27. Rinascita. 28 settembre 1973. No. 28.
28 Harman Ch. The fire last time… - P.200.
29. I cattolici degli anni 70. - Milano, 1977. - P.168.
30. Veselitsky A.A. Assassins: Destabilization Strategy and Terror Tactics in the Apennines. - M .: Politizdat, 1985. - P. 195.
31. Kin Ts.I. Three tragedies. - P.109.
32. Problems of peace and socialism. N 1, January 1990. - P.54.
33. Ibid. - P.55.
34. Berlinguer E., Bufalini P., Di Giulio F. e altre. I Communisti italiani e il Cile. - Roma, 1973. - P.23.
35. Berlinguer E. La politica internazionale dei communisti italiani. - Roma, 1976. - P.115.
36. L'Unita. 18 luglo 1980. - P.3.
37. Berlinguer E. La Questione communista. - Roma, 1975. - P.201.
38. Interview. winter 1991/92. N 2. - P.13.
39. Modern monopoly capitalism: Italy. - M .: Thought, 1983. - P. 300.
40. Ibid.
41. Lenin V.I. Op. 4th edition. T. 21. - P. 223.
42. Problems of peace and socialism. - M., 1990. - N 1. - P.54.
43. Modern monopoly capitalism: Italy. - P.301.
44. Problems of peace and socialism. - M., 1990. - N 1. - P.57.